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Abstract  
Whether social movements can catalyse change has preoccupied researchers; yet, the 
question of how such change can be created is equally important. Specifically, there has been 
little investigation of how women’s movements engage in the process of implementation of 
women’s rights laws. The Domestic Violence Coalition, a collective of women’s rights 
organizations in Ghana, was instrumental to the passage of the Domestic Violence Act in 
2007, and this study investigates how the Coalition subsequently attempted to influence 
implementation of the Act. Drawing from social movement literature, we applied an 
analytical framework consisting of three internal factors (strategies, movement 
infrastructure, and framing) and two external factors (political context and support of allies) 
that could have mediated the Coalition’s impact on implementation, and assessed their 
relative significance. The findings are that changes in the movement infrastructure were the 
most significant in explaining relative ineffectiveness, adversely affecting the Coalition’s 
ability to employ effective strategies and take advantage of a conducive political context and 
the presence of allies. This article advances the literature on rights advocacy by women’s 
movements by analyzing the challenges in translating success in policy adoption into 






While the literature has shown that women’s movements can play a key role in the adoption of 
women’s rights laws (Adomako Ampofo 2008; Htun & Weldon 2010; Tripp, Casimiro, Kwesiga, 
Mungwa 2008; Tsikata 2009), their role in the implementation of such legislation is less well 
explored. Further, the relatively thin scholarship that does exist is mainly based on Western 
contexts, with a few exceptions (see Burgess 2012; Jubb 2001; Medie 2015, 2018; Walsh 2008). 
We address this knowledge gap by studying how the women’s movement in Ghana has attempted 
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to participate in the implementation of the  Domestic Violence Act, 2007 (Act 732) in Ghana, 
while identifying the factors that explain the movement’s lack of impact in this phase of the policy 
process relative to its success in the adoption of the legislation. We recognize that policy 
implementation is affected by a multiplicity of factors, and is primarily the responsibility of 
government, yet the literature shows that social movements can be important in influencing the 
implementation of legislation, and it is on their role that we focus. 
The passage into law in 2007 of the Domestic Violence Bill in Ghana was largely attributed 
to the vibrant campaign conducted by the National Coalition on Domestic Violence Legislation in 
Ghana (Domestic Violence Coalition or DVC)—a coalitioni of civil society organizations (CSOs) 
that is part of the larger women’s movement in Ghana (Adomako Ampofo 2008; Crawford and 
Anyidoho 2013; Fallon 2008; Tsikata 2009). However, a picture has emerged post- 2007 of slow 
implementation of the Act by the bodies tasked with setting up the ancillary laws, bodies and 
processes required to make the legislation effective. Yet, there have been no studies that investigate 
empirically whether and how the DVC has sustained its influence in the implementation of the law 
it fought for. 
The question of whether social movements can create change has preoccupied researchers, 
but just as important is the question of how such change can be created (Andrews 2001). In this 
paper, we examine how the DVC as a movement organization attempted to influence 
implementation of the DV Act, and also consider those factors, within and outside of the 
movement, that have mediated its impact on implementation. We specifically examine the role of 
the DVC in influencing the establishment and effective operation of the institutions, instruments, 
and processes that are described in the Act as being crucial for the delivery of justice and services 
to survivors of domestic violence, namely: a Legislative Instrument; a National Policy and Plan of 
Action; the Domestic Violence Management Board, and the Domestic Violence Support Fund. We 
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also include in our discussion the resourcing of the Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit 
(DOVVSU) of the Ghana Police Service. We borrow from Andrews (2001, 72) in arguing that the 
‘focus on institutional outcomes makes sense because it encompasses the long-term goals of many 
social movements’. In so doing, we acknowledge the omission of other levels of implementation, 
including the “street level” (Lipsky 2010).  We argue, however, that, given the dearth of research 
in this area, an initial, even if narrowly-focused, examination of overarching structures is important 
as these influence the working of actors, institutions, and processes at other levels. 
We draw on social movement literature to construct an analytical framework of the key 
factors that have influenced the impact of movements. This framework consists of three internal 
factors (strategies, movement infrastructure, and framing) and two external factors (political 
context and support of allies). We then apply this set of factors to our case-study of the DVC in 
Ghana, and assess their relative significance in explaining the DVC’s influence. We argue that, of 
the five factors, changes in movement infrastructure have been most decisive in explaining the 
relative ineffectiveness of the DVC in influencing the implementation phase. The paper contributes 
to the growing literature that has sought to explain the strategies that social movements employ to 
influence implementation and the conditions under which movements can impact the 
implementation of laws and policies in areas such as women’s rights. 
A qualitative approach was adopted and data was collected through interviews with key 
informants, supplemented by review of newspapers articles. Twelve interviews (each lasting 
between one and three hours) were conducted between June 2009 and November 2010 with past 
and present coordinators of the DVC, organizational members who had hosted the DV secretariat, 
and individuals who led various aspects of the Coalition’s activities, many of whom were also 
heads of other women’s rights-promoting organizations. Between May 2015 and January 2016, 
we re-interviewed the coordinator and some members of the DVC, as well as the Director of the 
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Domestic Violence Secretariat within the Ministry of Gender. In all, seven interviews were 
conducted with five individuals in this second phase. A coding scheme was developed and applied 
to the interview transcripts to capture the actions that the DVC had taken in support of 
implementation of the DV Act and the challenges encountered in this process. These codes were 
both inductive and deductive; they were derived from the data as well as informed by a review of 
literature.  
A newspaper review aimed to provide more information on the implementation process 
and to triangulate information elicited through the interviews. We first identified newspaper 
articles in print media (Daily Graphic and The Chronicleii) and online news media (Joy FM website 
and Ghanawebiii) from 2007 to 2018 that mentioned the Act, the DVC, the DV Secretariat, the DV 
Management Board, DOVVSU or domestic violence. Approximately 300 articles were found in 
hardcopy and online, the contents of which were coded along a number of dimensions (including 
actors, activities, and challenges). To provide context, we also reviewed minutes of DVC meetings, 
government reports, background papers, informational pamphlets related to the Bill, official 
reports of parliamentary debates, the text of the Domestic Violence Act, 2007 (the Act), and the 
national plan of action.  
The paper is in five parts. The next part examines the literature on the role of social 
movements in the enforcement of women’s rights legislation and constructs an analytical 
framework of the key factors that influence the impact of such movements. The third part describes 
the involvement of the DVC in the passage of the Domestic Violence Act, 2007, and the fourth 
focuses on the role of the DVC in the implementation of the Act at the national level. Finally, we 
draw conclusions about the potential of social movements to influence implementation of domestic 
violence and other women’s rights legislation. 
 
  5 
Influence of Social Movements on Implementation Processes 
Although the literature is mostly silent on the implementation of women's rights legislation in 
Africa, there is a larger body of literature in non-African contexts, notably in the fields of public 
administration and sociology, that investigates both policy implementation generally and the 
implementation of domestic violence policies and laws specifically. Of particular relevance to this 
article is literature that suggests that social movements can impact policy implementation by 
influencing the establishment, funding, and performance of institutions (Amenta et al. 2010; 
Andrews 2001; Medie 2013). From this literature, we identify three internal factors (strategies, 
movement infrastructure, and framing) and two external factors (political context and support of 
allies) that provide an analytical framework to assess the relative impact of the DVC.  
In a review of literature on how movements engender change, Andrews (2001) describes 
an “action-reaction” model that suggests that the use of disruptive and attention-seeking strategies 
such as protests will elicit responses from powerful actors with influence over the policy process, 
but points out that there is little empirical evidence that these movements have much influence 
beyond the initial agenda-setting stage. He then presents the “access-influence” model that 
proposes that movements can influence policy formulation and implementation through “the 
acquisition of routine access to the policy through institutionalized tactics” (Andrews 2001, 75).  
This model is also consistent with the implementation phase of the policy cycle; in contrast to the 
policy formulation phase in which there might be a single concrete goal, routine access to policy 
arenas would further the more diffused goal of institution building. Thus, one can conclude that an 
action-reaction model may be appropriate for agenda setting but that the access-influence model 
is more appropriate for thinking about the policy implementation phase.  
In the implementation phase, studies show that social movements employ a variety of 
strategies including lobbying decision-makers, building the capacity of implementers, providing 
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funds to the government, and disseminating information. As an illustration, women’s organizations 
in Liberia used two main strategies in advocating for the establishment of a specialized sex crimes 
prosecution unit: they lobbied key actors within the government, including senior personnel of the 
Ministry of Justice, and disseminated the findings of their study on the prevalence of sexual 
violence to the Ministry, in a bid to convey the urgency of the problem (Medie 2013).  Women’s 
organizations in Guatemala and Nicaragua, working with international organizations, supported 
the government with funding and information in order to influence the creation of women’s police 
stations (Walsh 2015). The access-influence model suggests that movements will move towards 
“less disruptive tactics” in the implementation phase such as lobbying, capacity building, and 
resourcing, while still making an implicit “threat” that they can work outside the state structures if 
compelled to (Andrews 2001, 76). Thus, the literature recognizes disruption as a tactical strategy 
when necessitated by circumstances (Andrews 2001). Indeed, it may be argued that such strategies 
are more natural to social movements, grounded as they are in “contentious” collective action that 
aims to contest the power of the state and other better-resourced actors (Tarrow 2011). 
 The internal organization or infrastructure of movements can influence both the choice 
and efficacy of strategies used. Andrews’ (2001) movement infrastructure model builds on both 
the action-reaction and access-influence models by focusing on the internal changes that must 
occur in a movement if it is to be successful in influencing policy—specifically in regard to 
organizational structure and resources.  He proposes that, to the extent that the confluence of these 
elements allows the movement to employ a variety of strategies, the more influence it can have on 
policy implementation.  
Scholars have pointed to framing as another factor in policy implementation (Cress and 
Snow 2000; Ganz 2000; McCammon et al. 2007). Social movements engage in framing when they 
actively engage in “producing and maintaining meaning for constituents, antagonists, and 
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bystanders” (Cress and Snow 2000, 1071). Cress and Snow (2000) differentiate between 
diagnostic and prognostic framing. The former “problematizes and focuses attention on an issue, 
helps shape how the issue is perceived, and identifies who or what is culpable,” while “prognostic 
framing is important because it stipulates specific remedies or goals for the [social movement 
organization] to work toward and the means or tactics for achieving these objectives” (p. 1071). 
Furthermore, framing is not just about how movements construct their cause; the framing of a 
movement is simultaneously carried out by the media and the state, among others.   
Strategies, movement infrastructure, and framing are factors that are somewhat within the 
purview of social movements. There is also a set of “external” variables that impact the ability of 
movements to influence implementation. In particular, the political context influences social 
movement mobilization, strategies used, and impact seen (Amenta et al. 2010). The political 
context has been used to describe the institutional structure of the political system as well as the 
“informal structure of power relations that characterize the system” (McAdam 2012, p. 26).  One 
aspect of this is the openness of the political environment — which describes the openness to the 
articulation of interests and thus, the institutional accessibility — which affects a movement’s 
involvement in the implementation process (Kitschelt 1986). Kriesi (2004, p. 71) explains, based 
on a study of Western democracies, that “[s]trong states are characterized by institutional 
structures that limit their accessibility with respect to their environment and make them capable of 
getting things done, whereas weak states have institutions that open them up, but also limit their 
capacity to act.” While states in Africa might not perfectly fit these models, it is clear that some 
states are more open than others. For example, in Ethiopia, Burgess (2012) found that the domestic 
violence legislation had not been implemented partly because the government had prevented 
women's movements from contributing to implementation. In contrast, Medie (2013) found that 
the Liberian government’s willingness to work with women’s organizations, combined with 
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political and financial support from international organizations, had enabled the country’s women's 
movement to have an impact on implementation of the country’s rape law. Indeed, the political 
context also describes repression and other forms of social and physical control that paralyze, slow 
down, or demobilize dissent (McAdam and Tarrow 2019). Importantly, the political context also 
affects the kinds of strategies adopted. In a study of anti-nuclear movements in Europe and North 
America, Kitschelt (1986) found that those operating in “open” political systems adopted 
assimilative strategies such as lobbying, while those in “closed” systems opted for more 
confrontational strategies such as public demonstrations. In the case of Ghana, Tsikata (1989, 
2009) argues that the contemporary women’s movement has become more political in both the 
issues it takes on and in its approach compared to the period of authoritarian and military regimes 
in the country’s history.  
Another component of the political context is the presence of allies within the state and the 
implementing agency. Political mediation models are employed to assert that a movement is more 
likely to produce policy change when actors within the state “see benefit” in addressing the 
concerns of the group represented by the movement (Amenta et al. 2010, 298). However, these are 
not the only set of allies that matter for implementation. Allies outside of the state and the 
implementing institution also matter for the impact of social movements on the implementation 
process (Anyidoho & Crawford 2014, Medie 2013, Medie & Walsh forthcoming, Montoya 2009, 
Walsh 2015). Walsh (2015), in a comparative study of Nicaragua and Guatemala, found that 
women’s organizations were more likely to successfully create women’s police stations when they 
worked with international organizations and when they encountered an opening in the political 
opportunity structure.  
In summary, despite the complexity of explaining movement impact, the review of the 
literature has suggested factors that we use to frame our analysis in this paper. Nonetheless, as 
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Amenta et al. (2010) note, “there are no specific organizational forms, strategies, or political 
contexts that will always help challengers” (296).  Rather, it is the “combinations of specific forms 
of mobilization, action, and political factors that determine whether movements have 
consequences” (Amenta and Caren 2004, 469). Our objective in this paper is to understand how 
the DVC has sought to influence policy implementation and how the combination of the factors 
delineated above influences its effectiveness. This analysis is undertaken in the next section, 
following a brief account of the DVC’s key role in campaigning for the legislation to be passed. 
 
The DVC and the Passage of the Domestic Violence Act 
Drawing from existing literature and primary data, we give a brief overview of the DVC’s role in 
the passage of the DV Act as a background for the analysis of its role in the implementation stage 
and then provide a narrative of the progress of implementation since 2007. 
The DVC had its origins in the campaign against serial killings of women in Accra between 
1997 and 2001 when women’s groups formed a loose coalition called Sisters’ Keepers to confront 
the President and government agencies about their lack of action.iv  Subsequently the campaign 
was expanded to address the broader agenda of violence against women in Ghanaian society. One 
key issue was the absence of legislation, despite research indicating that one in every three women 
and girls in Ghana suffered some form of domestic violence (Coker-Appiah and Cusack 1999). 
Thus, in March 2003, representatives from 45 women’s rights and other organizations came 
together and formed the National Coalition on Domestic Violence Legislation in Ghana. As a 
member of the new coalition put it, “The women’s movements [in Ghana] put their little turf wars 
aside and were all part of the coalition” (Interview with TNv, 13 July 2009).  
Different organizational members alternated the hosting of the secretariat and took the lead 
on particular activities (such as media campaigns, public education, training, and so on), as dictated 
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by their interests and capacity. Another characteristic of the coalition was its exclusively Ghanaian 
composition. Despite campaigns for domestic violence legislation being a common struggle by 
women’s rights advocates worldwide, the DVC had few linkages to international organizations, in 
part because of the DVC’s wariness of being portrayed as advocates of an externally-imposed 
agenda (Interview with AC, 29 July 2009). As a former coordinator stated, “No international 
networks were formed...It was an internal fight and internally focused” (Interview with OB, 2 July 
2009). 
Predating the official formation of the coalition, women’s legal organizations had been 
involved in the drafting of possible domestic violence bills in 2001 and 2002, in collaboration with 
the Attorney-General’s Department. In spite of this early partnership, the Bill that was finally 
presented for passage faced significant resistance within government.vi The most vociferous public 
opposition, surprisingly, came from the Minister for Women and Children’s Affairs, Gladys 
Asmah, who repeatedly and publicly contended that parts of the Bill were contrary to Ghanaian 
cultural values (Tsikata 2009; Interview with NE, 6 July 2009). The Minister’s personal opposition 
led to what one Coalition member described as “a big fight” between her and the DVC, one that 
was frequently played out in the media (Interview with BC, 29 July 2009). During the 2004 
election campaign, activists placed significant pressure on the government to effect changes at the 
Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs (MOWAC) (Fallon 2008), which duly came with the 
appointment of Alima Mahama as Minister for Women and Children’s Affairs. A lawyer with 
previous civil society involvement, Mahama was regarded by the women’s movement in Ghana 
as an ally. The DVC was able to lobby her successfully and she was, in turn, instrumental in 
influencing the Cabinet to support the Bill. After approval by the Cabinet, the Bill then went to the 
Parliament where it faced considerable opposition, with prominent male MPs expressing concerns 
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in the House that the Bill would cause “social dislocation” within Ghanaian society and would 
lead to men being “trampled upon by their wives and denied their conjugal rights.”vii  
To counter such opposition, the DVC engaged in a variety of strategies in different spaces 
that aimed at raising support in the wider Ghanaian society (Crawford & Anyidoho 2013). These 
included: media campaigns, public demonstrations and marches, and training of Coalition 
members, sympathetic civil society actors, and media personnel. The Coalition also embarked on 
a nationwide public education campaign, holding public meetings in most parliamentary 
constituencies, hosted by local organizations, and undertaking a signature campaign, with 
constituents signing a petition in support of the Bill. One DVC member observed afterwards, 
In my lifetime there has not been any other legislation that has generated so much public 
interest and incorporated so much public opinion. [Interview with NE, 6 July 2009]  
 
Additionally, the DVC engaged with the Parliament in strategic ways, including by 
depositing a copy of the petition with signatures from each MP’s constituency into their respective 
pigeonhole. They targeted the Women’s Caucus in Parliament and the Committee for Gender and 
Children’s Affairs, and encouraged them to lobby MPs from within. The Coalition achieved its 
immediate goal when Parliament finally passed the bill on 21 February 2007 and enacted it into 
law in May 2007.  
Thus, the Coalition, and its constituent bodies, as representatives of civil society, played a 
crucial role in the adoption of the domestic violence legislation in Ghana, their achievement due 
in large part to the variety of strategies–both assimilative and confrontational (Kitschelt 1986)–
that were employed as appropriate for different constituencies and contexts.  
Over a decade later, the implementation of the DV Act has been characterized by an 
apparent lack of government commitment, notably on the part of the main implementing agency, 
the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection. At a minimum, implementation requires 
the establishment of those instruments and bodies stipulated in the Act, notably a Domestic 
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Violence Management Board, a Legislative Instrument drafted in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Justice, and a Victims of Domestic Violence Support Fund. The process of establishing these 
has been desperately slow.  
The Domestic Violence Management Board is responsible for key implementation tasks 
including formulating a national plan of action, monitoring and reporting on the implementation 
of the national action plan, collecting data on domestic violence, advising the Minister on policy 
matters, and preparing guidelines for the Victims of Domestic Violence Fund (Article 37). The 
Board is to be given administrative and technical support by the Domestic Violence Secretariat 
located within the Ministry of Gender (Article 40). Within the first three years after the passage of 
the DV Act (that is, between 2007 and 2010), the Ministry of Gender was headed by three different 
ministers. As each is also the chair of the Board, this meant periods of transition when there was 
no Board in place. When one was constituted, it had difficulty holding regular meetings (Interview 
with AC, 24 June 2015; Interview with IH, 25 June 2015). Additionally, the capacity of the DV 
Secretariat (in terms of staff strength and technical expertise) to support the work of the Board has 
been called into question (MOWAC 2011, cited in Manuh and Dwamena-Aboagye 2013).   
The Legislative Instrument (or LI, as it is commonly known in Ghana) supplements the 
DV Act through specific regulations on a range of pertinent processes (for example, training for 
the police and court officials, and the provision of shelter, social welfare, health services and 
financial assistance for victims), and as well as develops the administrative structures needed for 
these processes.viii The LI is crucial for the implementation of the Act and yet the executive arm 
of government failed for nine years to bring the LI before Parliament, despite pressure from the 
DVC, the public, and even parliamentarians (see Amenuveve 2012; “DOVVSU advocates LI” 
2012; “Ministry urged to speed up LI” 2014).  It was only passed in July 2016. 
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 The Act also establishes a Victims of Domestic Violence Support Fund (Article 29) to be 
administered by the Domestic Violence Management Board with financing by government and 
private organizations. It is meant to support the rescue, upkeep, and rehabilitation of victims of 
domestic violence. The Fund was finally launched in 2011 (Quaicoe-Duho, 2011) but, as of 
February 2018, no money had been put into it despite a High Court order requiring the government 
to do so (“Establish the domestic violence fund now”, 2018; “Gov’t given 6-months”, 2017).   
 
Implementing the 2007 Domestic Violence Act 
Why has the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act been so sluggish, given that twelve 
years have passed since its enactment? And, although implementation is the responsibility of 
government, why has civil society seemingly been unsuccessful in spurring on the process? We 
address these questions using the analytical framework that we constructed above from existing 
literature. First, we look at factors internal to or within the control and then consider external 
factors.  
Strategies Employed by the DVC to Support Implementation 
Here we seek to understand the strategies employed by the DVC and, implicitly, to assess the 
extent to which it was able to adapt its strategies to the institutions and processes of 
implementation. Our thematic analysis of primary data suggests that, broadly, the strategies used 
by the DVC are participation, cooperation (through funding, capacity-building and information 
dissemination), and lobbying. Participation represents working within the state while cooperation 
and lobbying locates the DVC outside of the state, but working to support implementation by the 
state.  
 We define participation as having a presence and working within the institutions and 
processes initiated by and under the control of the state agencies. The DVC is represented by its 
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Coordinator on the Management Board, which means that formally it has a seat on the working 
body that is to guide implementation of the Act.  However, the DVC works within other structures 
of implementation. One member of the DVC who had previously served on the Board was also 
co-opted on a technical team set up by the Ministry to draft the Legislative Instrument. Her 
description of the task indicates the level of contribution of the DVC: 
A lot of time, personnel, resources was put into the drafting of the LI, huge consultations held — 
all the components brought together, the medics, social services, health, all that came together. We 
even drafted the forms that will be used for referral. We did a really detailed piece of work. 
[Interview with IH, 25 June 2015] 
The DVC was also instrumental in the drafting and adoption of the National Domestic Violence 
Policy and the Plan of Action to Implement Domestic Violence Act (2009-2019) (or the National 
Policy and Plan of Action, in short) which guides the work of the Management Board and other 
implementers of the law (Quaicoe-Duho, 2008). A leading member of the Coalition explains why 
the activists took on this further task:  
After the Bill was passed, of course there was all this euphoria. And then we realized very quickly 
that we needed to have a policy that would enable implementation. And that’s because the Bill or 
the Act is a legal document, it takes care of the law. It doesn’t take care of the in-between. It doesn’t 
take care of the fact that organizations and agencies have to work together…in terms of integration 
and coordination, monitoring, and all. [Interview with BE, 24 June 2015] 
 
In other words, after the passage of the Act, the attention of the DVC shifted to implementation of 
the Act and, thus, key members of the DVC (including the Coordinator and others interviewed for 
this study) worked through the National Advocacy Partnership (NAP) Project Working Group to 
draft a plan of implementation after the Act. The membership of NAP was made up of “the usual 
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suspects” who had been involved in the passage of the Act, as a Coalition member put it. Formally, 
however, the group was distinct from the DVC, as she further explained: 
The Coalition was considered an advocacy group. You know, “be out there on the street, keep 
pressurizing the Government that this and that should happen”. If you look at the NAP documents, 
it was called a working group or a working partnership… It was just the focus of the work was 
different…This was trying to look at a coordinated approach towards addressing violence against 
women and children in Ghana, from an institutional point of view, how institutions should work 
together…Whereas the DV Coalition is the “tsooboyi”…ix [Interview with BE, 24 June 2015] 
This quote suggests an awareness within the DVC about the need for different types of strategies. 
Here, this was signalled by the creation of a separate organization from the DVC that focused on 
drafting an implementation plan which was fronted by the erstwhile MOWAC and eventually 
adopted in 2008 by the Government of Ghana.x We categorize the involvement of the DVC (or its 
members) in this process as participation because, while the NAP working group was instrumental 
in initiating the plan, its adoption and use was under the Ministry of Gender. There are, however, 
elements of cooperation—as described in the subsequent paragraph—because of the initial 
independent action taken by the DVC to begin developing the plan of action. 
Cooperation represents a slightly different approach than participating in activities and 
systems set up by the state; it involves the DVC taking independent initiative in activities that 
support the state in implementation of the legislation.   In our analysis, we found three main 
avenues of cooperation: resourcing, capacity-building, and information-dissemination.  Although 
all these tasks are part of the mandate of the Management Board under the oversight of the Ministry 
of Gender, they have been taken up by the DVC either because of the lack of capacity or slow pace 
of the mandated state structures.   
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Inadequate resourcing challenges the implementation of the DVC and other policies. As a 
Coalition member observes, 
This is Ghana. I mean, laws can be passed, policies can be [passed] and then putting the money 
into it becomes a problem. Government still expects donors to fund these things, coordinating 
institutions like MOWAC, or now Gender Ministry, do not have the staff capacity nor the resources. 
[Interview with BE, 24 June 2015]. 
Therefore, in support of the implementation of the DV Act, the DVC has, on occasion, provided 
funds to the Management Board to hold meetings and to pay for sitting allowances of Technical 
Committee members (Interview with IH, 25 June 2015).  
Capacity-building involves building up the state’s ability to enact the domestic violence 
legislation. Among other capacity-building activities, the DVC organized a “consultative seminar” 
for DOVVSU regional officers, and distributed copies of the DV Act to officers (Quaicoe-Duho 
2008). The Coalition also planned a national consultation dialogue for the judiciary and DOVVSU 
officers, among others (Interview with IH, 25 June 2015; Interview with WO, 26 May 2015). 
Again, these are activities that the Domestic Violence Management Board is mandated to carry 
out but which were initiated by the DVC.   
Finally, information dissemination is another one of the responsibilities of the Domestic 
Violence Management Board which the DVC, in a spirit of collaboration, has got involved in. The 
DVC works to inform and educate the public as well as units and individuals within the public 
service about their role in the prevention or prosecution of domestic violence cases. For instance, 
the DVC organized education programmes for media practitioners (Agyekum-Gyasi & Kyei-
Boateng 2011) and for the general public (Glover 2010) in different parts of the country in 2009 
and 2010.  
 In contrast to participation and cooperation, lobbying as a strategy presents civil society 
organizations as independent from, even oppositional to, state implementing agencies. The DVC 
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has lobbied the Ghana Police Service, the Minister of Interior, and Minister of Gender, Children 
and Social Protection (henceforth Minster of Gender) regarding the quantity and quality of its 
human resources at DOVVSU (Interview with AC, 24 June 2015) and petitioned the Minister of 
Gender to make the case for professionalizing DOVVSU (Interview with IH, 25 June 2015). 
Indeed, as a matter of course, the Coalition would meet with any newly appointed Minister of 
Gender to brief her on the Coalition’s concerns, including the implementation of the Act (ibid.)  
Additionally, the DVC has issued press releases, op-ed pieces and serialized newspaper articles on 
the content and implication of the DV Act, all attempting to use civic education to generate public 
pressure to motivate the government to act. 
 In sum, the DVC as a social movement organization has attempted to adapt itself to the 
processes of implementation. While the pre-Act period was marked much more by lobbying, post-
2007 the DVC has worked more formally with the state through participation and collaboration. 
Its continued use of lobbying as a strategy, though in a more limited way, highlights the DVC’s 
position as an outsider in implementation processes and structures. Also notable is the absence of 
the more “disruptive” or “contentious” strategies demonstrated in the policy formulation stage (see 
Crawford & Anyidoho 2013).  The DVC has not engaged in the protests, marches, or provocative 
public performances that it had previously undertaken to such great effect (ibid.). There are 
different possible explanations for this. One is that the DVC may have been de-radicalized by its 
association with the government. There are some who maintain that the ideological positions and 
histories of CSOs in the global South make them natural enemies of the state and that social 
movements are most effective when they maintain an oppositional stance (e.g. Busch, 1992; 
Tarrow, 2011) Thus, there is a certain caution with which some women’s movements approach 
the state, partly due to the unequal power relationship (especially in the context of policy 
formulation and implementation over which the former have greater control), and partly because 
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of the fear that movements might lose their feminist radical edge (Basu 2010), although the 
argument can also be made that engagement in policy processes does not automatically lead to co-
optation (Weldon 2011). There is nothing in the interviews to suggest that the DVC has been 
deradicalized or co-opted by the state; members still see their organization as apart from the state, 
and still regard it as their duty to push the state to act. Alternative explanations for the slow pace 
of implementation may lie in the other elements of our conceptual framework, specifically 
movement infrastructure (specifically questions of resources and organizational structure) and 
framing. We now turn to these two factors and discuss their interaction with strategy.  
Movement infrastructure 
At the height of the advocacy for the domestic violence law, the DVC had a membership of about 
100 organizations and individuals, a steering committee and a secretariat in Accra, hosted by a 
membership organization and run by a Coordinator, who was the only full-time member of staff. 
In the first phase of the research in 2009 and 2010, and in the second phase in 2015, members 
acknowledged that their energies had waned in the aftermath of the passing of the bill. There were 
a number of reasons for this.  
To begin with, there was the difficulty of maintaining the momentum of the advocacy work 
that the Coalition had undertaken to help push the Domestic Violence Bill through Parliament. As 
discussed previously, the Domestic Violence Act became a reality only after a sustained campaign 
which was particularly intense in the three years leading up to the passage of the Act.  It is not 
surprising that the DVC thereafter “lost steam”, as one member put it. She explained this was a 
result of fatigue and change of focus among some members. 
The leaders from 1999 till, you know, 2007 are getting on and many people are changing focus, 
you know, many people have moved on; the younger ones that we worked with, many have moved 
on into corporate organizations. [Interview with BE, 24 June 2015] 
  19 
This combination of fatigue and an aging membership with fewer younger members to take over 
from the old guard (Interview with BE, 24 June 2015; Interview with IH, 25 June 2015) may 
explain the stance of some members that the passage of the Act should mark the end of their efforts 
as a coalition, even while others argued the need to extend their effort into making sure that the 
law was actually implemented. Another member describes this debate at a DVC meeting held after 
the Act was passed: 
First and foremost, the DVC was set up as a force to ensure the passage of the Act. So, in 2007, 
DVC had succeeded. It could have closed shop. After May 2007 when the Act was passed members 
of DVC now came together and said, “Okay, legally we don’t exist, we have died. How can we 
ensure that we are still useful?”…And at this meeting there were some movers and shakers who 
thought, “We have finished our work, let us just close shop,” and other movers and shakers who 
said, “No, we know our history in Ghana. We pass laws and they just end up on the shelf so then 
adwuma a yƐayƐ no, na yƐabrƐ aguxi, so by all means let us keep it going. Let’s decide on what we 
need to do, first of all, to stay relevant as a coalition but, most of all, to ensure that what we set out 
to do—that the reason for our trying to get the Act passed—is sustained.” [Interview with BC, 15 
June 2015] 
 
Yet, it does not appear that this tension was resolved fully, as another member implied:  
I think the Coalition should have had this conversation but I am not aware we’ve had it in a very 
structured way. Really asked ourselves the hard questions: “Where are we now? Where do we go 
from here? How do we make that progress?” And the even more fundamental question, “Are we 
relevant?”  [Interview with IH, 25 June 2015]. 
Not surprisingly, given the above dynamics, respondents described the coalition as weaker and 
less unified after 2007. There is a fragmentation of efforts observed by members where similar 
activities have been undertaken by member organizations of the DVC, although not necessarily 
under its aegis. For example, in their own right, the Network for Women’s Rights in Ghana 
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(Netright), Abantu for Development, the Gender Studies and Human Right Documentation Centre 
(or Gender Centre), LAWA Ghana, and WiLDAF have all regularly played advocacy roles or 
engaged with various stakeholders in issues related to the DV Act.  
The availability of resources is an important component of movement infrastructure and 
the efficacy of movements in effecting change. In many respects, the DVC was remarkable in that 
it was able to achieve so much with so little external resources, and largely relied on contributions 
from its member organizations. This was partly a result of circumstance as the DVC at the time 
was an unregistered entity and could not officially raise or receive funds, but it was also a conscious 
choice to retain autonomy (Interview with AC, 29 July 2009). Thus, for the duration of its 
advocacy for the Domestic Violence Bill, office space and administrative support for the 
Coordinator (the sole permanent staff member) was provided on a rotating basis by member 
organizations. The DVC could have such a skeletal administrative set up because members 
provided the time, expertise and physical labour required at no cost. In addition, members funded 
many of the activities the Coalition undertook since many of these fell within their mandates or 
areas of operation and they could raise funds through their organizations. For instance, the Gender 
Center received money from WomanKind to support a national educational campaign, while grants 
from the donor-funded Rights and Voice Initiative (RAVI) came through the Ark Foundation and 
paid for the launch of a DVC-produced documentary on domestic violence and other media 
activities (Interview with AC, 31 July 2009; Interview with BC, 29 July 2009). While the 
subsequent registration of the Coalition as a legal entity made it eligible to solicit funds, the 
funding landscape has changed in the decade since the Act was passed. Our respondents spoke of 
lack of resources coming in directly to the DVC and indirectly through its organizational members, 
explaining this as the result of a shift in donor interest from domestic violence issues and a general 
decrease in funds for NGO work. This observation is borne out by empirical research. Apusigah, 
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Tsikata and Mukhopadyay (2011) point to a marked shift in the agenda and areas of funding by 
aid agencies that left donor-dependent organizations floundering. They add, “The new aid 
modalities and the global financial crisis have further served to change donor agendas in directions 
inimical to women’s rights activism” (xv-xvi). They point to particular new requirements for more 
formalization and bureaucratization that makes it more difficult for organizations to operate within 
“loose entities, networks or coalitions” and also has had the effect of “removing the fluidity of 
operational dynamics, and taking out personal commitments and passions, sometimes even 
compromising on [organizations’] feminist politics” (64). It is clear then that the relative lack of 
funding, and the new requirements for what little funding exists, has constrained the ability of the 
Coalition to access the financial resources that could potentially have invigorated its inputs into 
policy implementation. Somewhat paradoxically, the dynamism that characterized the operations 
of pre-2007 DVC was achieved without significant external resources. However, the funding space 
has become more constrained at the very time when financial resources have become more 
necessary. Moreover, it is difficult to sustain that level of voluntary effort for long-term policy 
implementation, which has made the relative unavailability of external funds more debilitating 
than it was during the adoption process. This is especially challenging because significantly more 
resources are required to implement the Act than were required for it to be passed. In sum, the 
combination of fatigue, attrition of members, changed focus, and constricted funding means that 
the DVC does not have the human and financial resources to carry out as many activities as broadly 
and intensely as it did before. 
Framing  
The DVC was able to frame the passage of the domestic violence law as an event that was 
important to women’s physical and political well-being. It was successful in both the diagnostic 
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framing of domestic violence as a problem that affected women’s physical and mental well-being 
in Ghanaian society, and in the prognostic framing of the Domestic Violence Bill as the solution.  
Post-2007, the framing of both the cause and the movement is less clear and forceful.  The 
process of the Act’s implementation lacks the trenchant debate about Ghanaian cultural values 
which held the attention of the public and kept the issue of domestic violence in the public 
discourse.  The framing of the DV Act as an important piece of legislation has not changed. 
However, in the implementation phase, what constitutes a solution to domestic violence is not as 
clear and as compelling as the act of passing legislation, given that there are many more 
institutional actors, processes and systems involved in actually implementing the law. The DVC’s 
original goal, its raison d’être, was the passage of a law on domestic violence. In the aftermath of 
achieving this, the movement has had an internal conflict about its own purposes and relevance, 
which ambivalence has mitigated against a clear framing of its overall purpose. Framing is often 
discussed in the context of mobilization of citizens to join social movements, and one might argue 
that this factor is not as important in the implementation phase which involves interaction mainly 
with politicians and technocrats who have different motivations than the public, and to whom the 
“emotional and cognitive appeals” through which social movements might ordinarily frame their 
causes (Weldon 2006, 58) might matter less than political interests and expediency.  Nonetheless, 
the ability of the DVC to project unity and strength, and to demonstrate that it has a constituency, 
would strengthen its influence on the state institutions who have greater control over the 
implementation process. Thus, while we would argue that strategy and movement infrastructure 
seem to be more significant factors, framing also matters.  
Political context 
In contrast to the internal factors of strategies, movement infrastructure and framing, the overall 
political context has remained largely unchanged, despite the changes in government. There still 
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exists an open political environment where civil society is able to express opposition to the 
government in the media and to make representation to the government. On the other hand, the 
main challenge faced by the DVC in the legislative phase remain: that is, the tendency of the 
government and opposition parties to not give adequate weight to domestic violence and women’s 
rights in the policy processes and in budgeting.   
There is agreement within the DVC that the state has not sufficiently invested in 
implementation of the Act and that it is still necessary for the DVC to exert continuous pressure 
on it.  As one interviewee explained, 
There have been many social legislative efforts that have happened in this country and if people 
don’t keep pushing, it doesn’t happen. Children’s Act, Intestate Succession Law, name them. So 
we thought, “We can’t let it go.” [Interview with BE, on 24 June 2015] 
However, while an open political context might have made it possible for the DVC to effectively 
advocate for new legislation by using public pressure on politicians, such advocacy may not be 
sufficient for them to change the behaviour of the technocrats who are key to implementation, 
particularly when implementation is happening in a context of limited resources.  
DVC members have expressed frustration with how the DV Secretariat within the Ministry 
has been managed, but have had little control over these bureaucratic systems and processes, which 
are susceptible to partisan politicking. The Coalition’s attempt to participate in and shape the work 
of the Management Board are described by members as an exercise in frustration. From our 
interviews, there have been at least four iterations of the Board as the Board had to be reconstituted 
each time a new minster has been appointed. The Board is chaired by the Minister and it appears 
that, in some cases, meetings are set up and then cancelled when the Minister is not available 
(Interview with IH, 25 June 2015). While the Board managed to produce a national plan of action, 
a past DVC representative on the Board spoke about other ways it could have been more effective 
by, for instance, documenting and archiving information on domestic violence, and producing 
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publications and report on these (ibid.)  Interviews with other DVC members support this blunt 
assessment by Manuh and Dwamena-Aboagye: 
[T]he greatest challenges for the effective implementation of the law and for the future remain the 
political will to enhance the capacity of all institutional stakeholders with the mandate to implement 
the law; the allocation of the necessary budgetary support; a robust monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism that ensures compliance and sanctioning for recalcitrant institutions; and the continued 
advocacy of civil society organizations (CSOs) at various levels, from the community to the 
national level (p. 205, emphasis added).  
Thus, while the overall political context has remained largely unchanged and relatively favourable 
to civil society activity, political will on the part of successive governments has not been evident.  
Support from external allies  
We have noted that pre-2007 the DVC had few linkages to international organizations inside or 
outside of the country. By contrast, the implementation phase has involved a wider range of 
organizations, with a greater role in particular for international organizations, both governmental 
and non-governmental. UN agencies such as UNFPA, UNICEF and UN Women are more 
involved, as are bilateral aid agencies such as DANIDA and country programmes of international 
NGOs such as ActionAid Ghana and Plan Ghana. For instance, UNICEF, at one point, supported 
the Secretariat to the Management Board with staff, while DANIDA supports the Secretariat’s 
programming on gender-based violence (Interview with Victoria Natsu, 26 May 2015). The 
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the UK government’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) have been among others who have provided technical support 
in the form of research expertise (Quaicoe-Duho, 2012), with the former also providing financial 
support for the implementation of the National Plan and Programme of Action for the DV law 
(Quaicoe-Duho, 2011). However, there has been little evidence of these international organizations 
purposefully partnering with the DVC specifically to influence national-level implementing 
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structures. In the absence of strong and sustained partnerships with international organizations, the 
DVC has likely missed opportunities to influence implementation. This is because studies have 
shown that collaboration between women’s movements and international organizations enables 
the former to impact the implementation process (Anyidoho & Crawford 2014, Medie 2013, Medie 
& Walsh forthcoming). This was the case in Liberia where women’s organizations were supported 
by and collaborated with international organizations such as the UN (Medie 2013). Montoya 
(2009), in her study of the European Union, argued that international organizations can build the 
capacity of domestic organizations working on violence against women by giving them resources, 
which is especially important for the sustained engagement required in the implementation phase.   
Pre-2007, the absence of international linkages was an asset to the DVC as it provided the 
coalition with legitimacy when countering arguments that the Bill was contrary to Ghanaian 
cultural values (Crawford & Anyidoho 2013). A Coalition member was able to say, with pride, 
about the advocacy for the Act, “It was an internal (local) fight and internally focused” (OB, 2 July 
2009).  Post-2007, in the implementation phase, the increased involvement of international 
organizations could be expected to strengthen the position of local advocacy organizations such as 
the DVC through the provision of international support for implementation of the Act. Yet such 
expectations have largely remained unfulfilled; there is little evidence that the DVC has made the 
effort to directly cultivate the support of allied international actors.  
 
Conclusion  
After the elation experienced by members of the Domestic Violence Coalition in Ghana in 2007 
at the culmination of their advocacy for a Domestic Violence Act, the subsequent decade has seen 
slow and limited progress in implementation of the Act. This article has examined how the DVC 
has participated in the implementation process, and sought to identify the factors that explain the 
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Coalition’s apparent lack of impact at this stage. We applied an analytical framework consisting 
of three internal factors (strategies, movement infrastructure, and framing) and two external factors 
(political context and support of allies). Our overall findings are that, of the five factors, the change 
in the movement infrastructure is the most significant in explaining the relative ineffectiveness of 
the DVC in the implementation stage. However, the findings also highlight the interconnections 
between the five factors. We elaborate these findings below. 
 In terms of strategies, the DVC has shown awareness of the need to shift strategy from the 
legislative to the implementation stage. The more disruptive or contentious strategies that were 
characteristic of the legislative phase have largely been discarded. The DVC has focused on 
strategies of participation within state processes and cooperation with state agencies, including 
provision of funds, capacity building and information dissemination. Such changes in strategy are 
consistent with the shift from an “action-reaction” model to an “access-influence” model in which 
actors attempt to gain “routine access” to the policy space to engage in institution building 
(Andrews 2001).   
However, the potential impact of this shift in strategy has been moderated by less salutary 
changes in the coalition infrastructure, the most salient being a decline in the active participation 
of member organizations and to a constraint on funding of their activities, which has adversely 
affected the overall cohesion and capacity of the Coalition. Thus, while the DVC did adapt its 
strategic approach to one appropriate for the implementation stage, the changes in movement 
infrastructure to a looser and weaker coalition structure have militated against its effective 
application. 
The weakening of the movement infrastructure has also had an adverse effect on framing, 
again highlighting the interconnection of factors. While the Coalition’s diagnostic and prognostic 
framing of issues of domestic violence was unambiguous in the legislative phase (essentially, 
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domestic violence could be addressed with the passage of a Domestic Violence Act) and 
successfully communicated to the wider society, its framing is less clear and forceful in the 
implementation phase, partly due to unresolved internal conflicts about its own relevance and 
purpose in the post-legislation stage.  
 While the overall political context has largely remained unchanged and relatively 
favourable for civil society activity, the same constraints and challenges endure from the 
legislative phase, notably the lack of political will. Additionally, engagement in policy 
implementation processes is more complicated, given the greater numbers of actors, processes and 
systems involved in implementing the law, compared with the legislative stage. Post-2007, the 
DVC’s organizational capacity for advocacy has proved insufficient for the sustained pressure 
necessary to push government to undertake the more challenging and longer-term tasks of policy 
implementation.  
Finally, analysis of the DVC’s support from allies also provides useful findings. The 
DVC’s initial success was attained without significant international support. However, the post-
2007 environment has been characterized by greater involvement of international actors, both UN 
agencies and international NGOs. The experience in Ghana suggests that the involvement of 
international allies does not automatically facilitate the advocacy efforts of local movements; there 
needs to be a concerted effort on the part of both the movement and international actors to build 
partnerships based on shared goals that can in turn intensify the pressure on government to act (see 
Anyidoho & Crawford 2014). This has not happened in the case of the DVC and the DV Act. 
In sum, the study demonstrates the importance of movement infrastructure in explaining 
the DVC’s (lack of) impact on implementation of the DV Act. Additionally, our findings highlight 
the interconnections between the five factors of our analytical framework, rather than their 
separateness. The study illustrates how changes in key elements of the movement infrastructure, 
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in this instance a decline in its strength and cohesiveness, affected the DVC’s facility to decisively 
frame the debate, limited its capacity to effectively implement a change in strategic approach, and 
undermined its ability to negotiate the political context, which includes the presence of potential 
allies.  
Such findings add to the growing literature that has sought to explain the conditions under 
which women’s movements can impact the implementation of women’s rights laws and policies, 
especially in the context of the Global South. Previous research (e.g. Burgess 2012; Medie 2013; 
Medie and Walsh forthcoming) has shown that CSOs can have a positive impact on the protection 
of women’s rights in Africa. Our findings add weight to the literature that highlights the vital role 
of CSOs in advocating for legal protection against domestic violence, and for women’s rights more 
generally. However, the implementation of such laws, inclusive of the creation of relevant 
structures and processes, is the crucial next step if legal protection is to be meaningful. This case 
study of the DVC in Ghana demonstrates the important role of women’s movements in maintaining 
pressure for implementation and also demonstrates the potential weakness of coalitions. The initial 
strength of the DVC was in unifying a cross-section of women’s rights organizations around the 
goal of enacting a domestic violence legislation.  Yet this strength of coalition became a liability 
when, post-passage, the DVC experienced fragmentation, with many Coalition partners being 
compelled, mainly for financial reasons, to return to their core activities. In turn, this weakening 
of the movement infrastructure had an adverse effect on other key factors of impact (strategies, 
framing and alliance-building), and the overall influence of the DVC declined. The case of Ghana’s 
Domestic Violence Act starkly demonstrates the challenge for civil society groups of continuously 
re-creating themselves to respond to changing internal and external contexts in order to ensure that 
women’s rights legislation is implemented. 
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i We define a coalition as “collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational entities to 
pool resources in order to effect change” (Levi and Murphy 2006, 654).  
ii The Daily Graphic is the most widely circulated newspaper in Ghana and has a leaning towards the government, 
while The Chronicle is perceived as favourable to the opposition. 
iii Joy FM is the most prominent radio station and a major source of news stories, and Ghanaweb is an online repository 
of news from various sources. 
iv Approximately 30 women were found murdered in mysteriously similar ways, leading to the assumption of serial 
killing, a phenomenon that was virtually unheard of in Ghana (see Fallon 2008, Tsikata 2009). 
vFor purposes of confidentiality, initials are used that do not correspond to the actual names of interviewees. However, 
names have been maintained in reference to factual information that is in the public domain (for example, for public 
figures such as ministers of state). 
vi A provision in the draft Domestic Violence Bill for the repeal of section 42(g) of the Criminal Code, 1960, Act 29 
(which states that “The consent given by a husband or wife at marriage for the purposes of marriage cannot be revoked 
until the parties are divorced or separated by a judgement or decree of a competent Court”) was the cause of opposition 
within the government (Fallon 2008; Interview with BC, 29 July 2009; also Parliamentary Debates: Official Reports, 
15/02/07, p. 449). The Domestic Violence Act was eventually passed without the repeal of the “marital rape” clause, 
which was later removed from the Criminal Code (Tsikata 2009). 
vii Part of a statement made by Honourable Mr Okerchiri in Parliament: “Why should Parliament pass a bill which will 
allow our wives to trample upon us and deny us conjugal rights?” (Parliamentary Debates: Official Reports, 15/02/07, 
p.449.)   
viii It is promulgated by the executive arm of government and simply tabled with Parliament for 21 days, before 
coming into effect. 
ix A call for action.  
x In the document, the DVC is acknowledged only for their “suggestions and contributions” (MOWAC 2008, vi).   
xi In Akan: “All our work would have been for nothing.” 
                                               
